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The present work investigated the effects of trust 
violations on perceptions and risk-taking behaviors, 
and how those effects differ in human-human versus 
human-machine collaborations. Participants were 
paired with either a human or machine teammate in a 
derivation of a well-known trust game. Therein, the 
teammate committed one of three qualitatively different 
trust violations (i.e., an ability-, benevolence-, or 
integrity-based violation of trust). The results showed 
that ability-based trust violations had the largest impact 
on perceptions of ability; the other trust violations did 
not have differential impacts on self-reported ability, 
benevolence, or integrity, or risk-taking behaviors, and 
none of these effects were qualified by being partnered 
with a human versus a robot. Additionally, humans 
engaged in more risk-taking behaviors when paired with 
a robotic partner compared to a human over time. 
 
1. Introduction  
The military and industry view autonomous 
systems as key enablers for their respective future 
operations.  However, the greater complexity of truly 
autonomous systems often means less control and 
predictability of the system’s behavior [1], which may 
challenge human trust of the system. Autonomous 
systems capable of learning and adapting may have the 
capability to perform tasks themselves, but the operator 
must trust in the system to perform the task with little 
oversight in order for a “reliable” system to achieve 
maximum benefit.  One approach to understanding 
human acceptance of autonomous systems is 
understanding what heuristics (i.e., biases) humans use 
to gauge the trustworthiness of machines (e.g., robots, 
automated assistants, decision support systems) relative 
to humans. 
We structured the paper as follows. First, we 
discuss interpersonal trust. Next, we discuss how biases 
shape human perceptions of automated systems (e.g., 
decision support systems, robot partners). We discuss 
two frameworks that compare human-human and 
human-machine interactions and how they pertain to 
trust. From these competing models and extant work, we 
build a rationale for our hypotheses on how these biases 
lead to differential effects of violations of 
trustworthiness in human-human versus human-
machine teams. We then test these hypotheses in an 
experiment comprising human-human and human-robot 
teams playing a trust game and discuss our findings 
through the lens of trust research. 
1.1. Interpersonal Trust 
Trust is an important aspect of human behavior and 
has been labeled a core social motive [2]. Certain 
situational aspects must be present for interpersonal 
trust to be relevant: there must be at least two parties 
(e.g., individuals, organizations, groups), the 
relationship between those parties must present some 
risk (i.e., there must be something at stake), and the 
parties must be dependent on each other to a degree [3]. 
To understand trust, one must delineate it from its 
antecedents (i.e., propensity to trust and trustworthiness; 
[4]). The Mayer et al. model of trust depicts trust beliefs 
(e.g., trustworthiness, propensity to trust) as predictors 
of trust intentions (i.e., a willingness to be vulnerable) 
and trusting actions (i.e., assuming vulnerability and 
engaging in a risk-taking behavior), with trust intentions 
mediating the relationship between trust beliefs and trust 





actions. Although trust intentions and trust actions are 
closely related, they are theoretically distinct [4, 5].   
When partners are making their decision to trust or 
not, biases may come into play. Humans use social cues 
to form impressions, often times in an automatic fashion 
(e.g., [6]). In interpersonal interactions, aspects of others 
such as race, gender, and ethnicity shape these initial 
impressions (e.g., [7]). Trust research has revealed 
several trust-based biases that influence interpersonal 
interactions (see [8, 9]). These tendencies have 
developed from strong evolutionary pressures to detect 
possible allies, enemies, predators, prey, or mates in the 
environment [10]. 
1.2. Human-Machine Trust 
Trust in human-machine interactions can also be 
integrated into trusting actions (e.g., reliance on the 
robot or robotic system, monitoring behavior), trusting 
beliefs (e.g., perceptions of robot trustworthiness, 
automation schemas), and trusting intentions (a 
willingness to be vulnerable to the robot) [11]. In these 
contexts, trustworthiness is important because it leads to 
trust, and trust in turn leads to reliance behaviors [12]. 
Trust calibration is a function of perceived 
trustworthiness of and the reliance on the trustee or 
referent system.  Properly calibrated trust (i.e., relying 
on the tool when reliance is warranted) leads to more 
appropriate human use of automated systems (p. 55). 
Research has led to several competing models that 
compare human-human trust and human-machine trust. 
We focus on two: the computers as social actors (CASA; 
[13]) model and the unique-agent hypothesis [14]. The 
CASA model [13] postulates that people treat automated 
systems in much the same way as they do other humans, 
ascribing characteristics (e.g., personality, gender) to 
non-human systems such as computers [15] and website 
purchase assistants [13]. Humans at times 
anthropomorphize non-humans such as computers and 
trust computers in ways similar to people [13, 16]. The 
unique-agent hypothesis [14], in contrast, posits 
schemas, monitoring behaviors, trust judgements, and 
assessments of trust across human-human and human-
machine interactions based on previous research. In 
part, the model postulates humans are more sensitive to 
performance-based errors made by automated systems 
than they are for humans [17, 11]. 
In the trust in automation literature [12], 
perceptions of an automated system’s trustworthiness 
have been mapped on to antecedents proposed by Mayer 
et al. [4]. Specifically, Mayer et al. delineate perceptions 
of a referent’s ability (e.g., are they competent?), 
benevolence (e.g., do they have my interest in mind?), 
and integrity (e.g., are their principles acceptable?) 
which predict trust in human-human interaction. Lee 
and See ([12], p. 59) leveraged Mayer et al.’s [4] model 
and explicated perceptions of an automated system’s 
performance (e.g., is this system reliable?), purpose 
(what is this system’s intent?), and process (is this 
system consistent?) that predict trust in the automated 
system. However, until recently [18], little research has 
systematically manipulated aspects of a system’s 
trustworthiness and measured its effect on human trust 
toward automation, let alone those differences which 
may (or may not) arise in trust toward a human referent 
(see also [14]). Others have found that differences 
between relying on a human versus a robot to perform a 
task is largely influenced by the task type (i.e., 
dangerous to humans or not; [19]). A direct comparison 
while keeping the task environment neutral is necessary 
to effectively isolate bias involved in human trust of 
robots.  Otherwise, the trust process may operate 
differently across two different task domains – which 
would make the study of bias contaminated by the 
influence of task-specificity. 
As noted, researchers have begun to study the 
effects of trust violations on criterion and how they 
differ between human-human and human-machine 
interactions. de Visser et al. [14] instructed participants 
to guess what number would come next in a pattern of 
ten digits. Then, an agent (computer, avatar, and human) 
would make a suggestion with varying reliability. 
Participants had less trust toward less reliable agents 
over time, but anthropomorphism attenuated this effect: 
participants trusted anthropomorphic referents more 
than non-anthropomorphic referents. In two follow-on 
experiments, de Visser et al. found that 
anthropomorphism can have different effects on trust 
depending on whether it is a subjective or objective 
criterion, and contextual features can obfuscate the 
effects of anthropomorphism. Whereas de Visser et al. 
[14] focused on performance-based trust degradations, 
Alarcon et al. [18] investigated the effects of non-
performance-based trust violations on trust toward a 
human versus a machine teammate in checkmate [20], a 
derivation of the Berg et al. [21] trust game. Results 
showed that when the referent did not return the amount 
of money expected, trust declined. However, there was 
no effect of referent type, nor an interaction between 
condition (trust/distrust) and referent type on criterion 
of interest. However, Alarcon et al. [18] noted several 
limitations of their study of which we discuss later.  
1.3. Current Study 
A recent meta-analysis [22] demonstrated robot 
performance (e.g., failure rate, reliability) related factors 
were the strongest predictors of trust, supporting the 
literature on automation schema [17, 23]. Merritt and 
colleagues [24] have researched the Perfect Automation 
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Schema (PAS) and found that it is related to higher trust 
in automated systems. The premise of the PAS is that 
humans may hold a general view of automation that they 
are near-perfect and error-free. However, PAS may 
make humans less forgiving of automated systems when 
they perceive performance errors that violate their 
existing expectations of technology [11, 17]. Given the 
importance of performance as a significant driver of 
trust of automated systems, it is expected that perceived 
ability will have a stronger effect on the perceived 
trustworthiness of the robot relative to the human. Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Prior to a trust violation, participants 
will perceive a robotic partner to have higher ability than 
a human partner. 
Hypothesis 2: Prior to a trust violation, participants 
will wager more money with a robotic partner than with 
a human partner. 
Hypothesis 3: Ability/performance-based trust 
violations will reduce ability perceptions toward a 
robotic partner more than a human partner. 
Hypothesis 4: Ability/performance-based trust 
violations will reduce wagers toward a robotic partner 
more than a human partner. 
 
Humans often ascribed intent to human and non-
human agents.  Humans do not approach robots “tabula 
rasa” but rather with default models of the robot’s intent 
and knowledge [25]. When humans anthropomorphize 
robots, in-group and out-group biases may form. 
Research has demonstrated when participants were 
introduced to a robot with a name familiar within their 
country, they perceived it as warmer, psychologically 
closer, ascribed more of a mind to the robot, and had 
more contact than when the robot had a foreign 
sounding name [25].  Robots that display empathy may 
be more liked and trusted [26], suggesting the 
importance of intent from the robot. Robots can be 
believed to be responsible for mistakes, though not as 
much as a human in the same situation [27].  Thus, it is 
plausible that the impact of signaling intent may be 
weaker when directly comparing robots versus humans.  
Unlike humans, robots behave in accordance with 
their programming.  However, machines may someday 
have both decision authority and decision initiative to 
act autonomously. Then, a robot may be asked to 
“decide” what the best action might be for a set of 
stimuli and given set of rules of engagement.  Thus, it is 
plausible that perceived intent from a robot matters, but 
we theorize that perceived intent will matter more for 
humans versus robots as it is difficult to separate 
intentionality of a robot (or any kind of automated 
system) from the designer of that system [12]. Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Prior to a trust violation, participants 
will perceive a human partner to have higher 
benevolence than a robotic partner. 
Hypothesis 6: Benevolence/intent-based trust 
violations will reduce benevolence perceptions toward a 
human partner more than a robotic partner. 
Hypothesis 7: Benevolence/intent-based trust 
violations will reduce wagers toward a human partner 
more than a robotic partner. 
 
Consistency has demonstrated importance in 
human-automation collaboration as well as in 
interpersonal relationships.  Consistency, (thought of as 
integrity – alignment to shared values in the 
interpersonal domain; see [4]) is a rational evaluation of 
past successes and failures and has been shown to be the 
most important driver of trust in high-stakes 
interpersonal situations [28]. Maintaining consistent, 
predictable behavior is a core antecedent to trust as this 
predictability allows one to forecast behavior in novel 
situations.  Prior research has shown that consistency is 
key to trust of automation [29].  Predictability was 
considered a core antecedent for trust in automation in 
early studies of the construct [30]. The literature on 
HMT suggests the importance of shared mental models 
[16, 31], largely because shared mental models help 
humans anticipate the actions and needs of machine 
partners. Still, consistency/integrity of an automated 
system has been interpreted as a cue for intentionality 
which ought to be more strongly evoked from a human 
referent compared to a robot or other automated system 
[16, 18]. However, due to the asymmetry of perceived 
capability between humans and technology [17], we 
hypothesize that technology will likely pay a higher cost 
for deviations of consistency. Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 8: Prior to a trust violation, participants 
will perceive a human partner to have higher integrity 
than a robotic partner. 
Hypothesis 9: Integrity/consistency-based trust 
violations will reduce integrity perceptions toward a 
robotic partner more than a human partner. 
Hypothesis 10: Integrity/consistency-based trust 
violations will reduce wagers toward a robotic partner 
more than a human partner. 
 
In summary, we hypothesize humans have biases 
toward automated systems such as decision support 
systems and robots [17], and these biases influence how 
violations of system performance affects human trust 
[32]. However, few researchers have investigated the 
differential influence of trust violations on human and 
automated (i.e., robot) systems while controlling for 
contextual variability [14, 18] and also interpreting the 
effects of that violation through the lens of Mayer et al.’s 
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[4] trust model, which has been applied to human-
automation contexts [12]. The present work takes care 
to address the limitations of past work of Alarcon et al. 
[18]. Specifically, we use a validated measure [33] to 
assess trustworthiness toward both human and robot 
referents, which corresponds directly to the trust 
manipulations in the present work. Secondly, we 
leveraged manipulations from [34] which differentiate 
between ability-, benevolence-, and integrity-based 
violations (the latter two of which Alarcon et al. [18] 
conflated) of trustworthiness and measure their effects 
on criterion of interest. In this way, we more fully test 
the assumptions of the unique-agent hypothesis [14] 
inspired by work on automation bias [11, 17]. 
Specifically, the assumption that machines are 
perceived to be more competent than humans before an 
error occurs, and the steeper decline in trust toward 
machines compared to humans after an error is 
perceived, is based upon biases toward perceptions of a 
machine performance. In their Limitations, Alarcon et 
al. [18] explicitly state that this was the precise factor 
they held constant in investigating the effects of non-
performance-based trust violations on criterion of 
interest in human-human and human-robot partnerships, 
which limits the generalizability of their results in 
supporting the CASA model [13]. As such, we 
manipulate all three features of trustworthiness 
between-subjects to more fully test the assumptions of 
both the CASA and unique-agent hypothesis [14]. 
2. Method  
2.1. Participants 
A total of 44 participants completed the study; 
57.76% were female, their ages ranged from 18 and 62 
years (M = 30.69, SD = 12.21), consisting of 69.5% 
white/Caucasian, 19.05% black/African American, 
9.52% Asian, and 2.38% other ethnicities. The study 
required participants to be at least 18 years old. 
Participants were recruited from a local university and 
online craigslist ads. 
2.2. Task 
Participants were instructed to complete the 
Checkmate task [20]. Checkmate is an augmented 
investor dictator trust game (also referred to as the trust 
game; [22]) in which a banker (investor) sends money 
to the runner (dictator). The runner uses this investment 
to complete a virtual maze running task, in which they 
navigate through a virtual maze and collect boxes. The 
number of boxes collected is directly related to the 
earnings. The runner was able to keep the earnings to 
themselves or share the earnings with the banker. 
Participants were either paired with a human 
(confederate) or a robot (NAO robot) partner. In this 
study, participants were always the banker and the 
confederate (human or robot) was always the runner. 
Checkmate consists of a practice round and five 
rounds of the main task. In the practice round, 
participants were informed that money would not be 
gained/lost. Conversely, in the main task, money that 
was gained/lost was real and the final earnings were 
given to participants at the conclusion of the study. 
Participants began the task with $50 USD in their 
account (they were told that their partner began with the 
same amount as well). The banker loaned the money to 
the runner in hopes of the runner performing well in the 
maze running task and sharing the earnings with them. 
Before the banker sent their endowment, the runner 
notified the banker of the promised return and the risk 
level. Three risk levels: low (75–150%), moderate (50–
200%), or high (0–300%) were offered to the runner, the 
possibility of reward and loss was related to the risk 
level. For instance, if “high risk” was selected and the 
runner performed poorly, the runner could lose the 
entire endowment (0%) with nothing to keep or share 
with the banker. For consistency, the runner’s selection 
for risk level was always moderate (50–200%). 
After the banker makes an endowment, the runner 
can change the risk level without informing the banker. 
Since the runner was a confederate, the risk level was 
not changed but the banker was informed of this 
possibility. The banker could loan anywhere from $1-
$13. The runner and banker were given an aerial view 
of the maze, preceding each trial. Next, the runner had 
two minutes to collect as many boxes as possible. The 
banker was able to see the number of boxes the runner 
collected; however, the banker was not told how much 
money the runner earned. Once the trial was complete, 
the runner can send the banker their preferred amount; 
this can differ from the promised amount. The banker 
then receives the money from the runner and this 
process is repeated over the next few rounds until the 
conclusion of the study. Gains and losses from each of 
the five rounds carry over until the game is complete. 
For a full review of the task see Alarcon et al [20]. 
2.3. Manipulations 
2.3.1. Partner. A confederate was used to simulate the 
role of the runner in all conditions. Depending on the 
condition participants were assigned to, participants 
were partnered with either a human (confederate 
researcher) or a robot (NAO robot). The confederate’s 
actions were all pre-recorded and automated. 
Participants were presented with the pre-recorded 
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scenarios that corresponded to their condition through 
the platform. 
 
2.3.2. Condition. We used the manipulations outlined 
by Alarcon et al [34]. Specifically, the ability 
manipulation was a degradation in the runner’s 
performance such as running into buildings and going 
off into areas where there were no boxes. Integrity was 
manipulated by having the runner sending less money 
than promised back to the banker, with no discernable 
reasons for the lack of return (i.e., no performance 
degradations). Lastly, benevolence was manipulated by 
informing participants that the color of the boxes 
collected by the runner affect how earnings were 
distributed at the end of the round. Specifically, blue and 
white boxes generated earnings that could be shared 
between the runner and the banker, while red boxes only 
generated earnings for the runner. In the distrust rounds, 
the runner primarily collected red boxes that only 
benefitted the runner and could not be shared. Thus, 
participants viewed one of three manipulations of trust 
at rounds three and four of the experiment, a between-
subjects manipulation. Importantly, each trust-violation 
led to the same return of money from the runner to the 
banker post-round. Thus, trustworthiness was 
manipulated in terms of the reason for the return in 
rounds three and four, but actual returns were equated 
across ability-, benevolence-, and integrity-based 
violations. 
2.4. Measures 
2.4.1. Trustworthiness. Trustworthiness was measured 
using Mayer and colleagues’ [4] 17-item scale which 
measured ability, benevolence, and integrity. Ability 
was measured with six items (e.g., “I feel very confident 
about the runner’s skills”). Benevolence was measured 
with five items (e.g., “The runner really looks out for 
what is important to me”). Integrity was measured with 
six items (e.g., “The runner tries hard to be fair in 
dealings with others”).  Participants rated all items on a 
5-point scale, ranging from 1 (“Strongly Disagree”) to 5 
(“Strongly Agree”). 
 
2.4.2. Risk-Taking. Trust behaviors were assessed 
using banker loan selection (i.e., dollar amount sent to 
the runner), as described in the task section above, with 
more money lent by the banker (participant) indicating 
higher trust in the runner (confederate). 
2.5. Procedure 
This study was advertised online through craigslist 
and word of mouth in a mid-western city. Participants 
were told they would work with a partner in a computer-
mediated maze-running task. Once participants arrived, 
they were introduced to their partner (human 
confederate or NAO robot). In the human condition, the 
partner was taken to a different room. In the robot 
condition, the robot was placed near the participants on 
a desk. Once consent was attained, participants were 
administered several baseline surveys. Following the 
surveys, participants were instructed to complete an 
endowment task where they were given 10 minutes to 
complete five moderately difficult math problems. 
Participants were told that if they answered a minimum 
of three problems correctly, they would earn $50 USD 
to use in the task. Participants were given $50 USD 
regardless of their performance; this was done so that 
they perceived the money earned was by their efforts. 
A PowerPoint tutorial was presented providing 
details on how to perform the maze running task and 
explaining each player’s role. Following the training, 
participants were told that they were randomly assigned 
to be the banker. Deception was used since the 
participant was always the banker and the confederate 
was always the runner. The maze running task began 
with a practice round followed by five rounds of the 
task. Prior to each trial, participants sent a dollar amount 
to the runner. Following each trial, participants were to 
rate their partner’s ability, benevolence, and integrity. 
Once the task was complete, workers were debriefed 
and received their earnings as well as a $30 USD gift 
card for participation. 
3. Results  
All analyses were conducted using SPSS version 
23. A Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied when 
sphericity was not met. 
3.1. Trustworthiness 
Although trustworthiness perceptions were 
recorded for each round, the current study only included 
the last four rounds, which centered on the trust 
violation. A repeated-measures (RM) multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to test 
the effects of our between-subjects manipulations, Trust 
Violation type (Ability-based, Integrity-based, and 
Benevolence-based) and Partner (Robot and Human), 
and our within-subjects factor, Round, on the three self-
report perceptions of trustworthiness: ability, integrity, 
and benevolence (dependent variables). The main 
effects of Violation Type [Pillai’s V = .5, F(6, 70) = 
3.88, p < .01, ηp2 = .25] and Round [Pillai’s V = .61, F(9, 
324) = 9.24, p < .001, ηp2 = .2] were significant, but 
Partner [Pillai’s V = .07 , F(3, 34) = .79, p = .51, ηp2 = 
.07] was not significant. Round x Violation Type 
[Pillai’s V = .27, F(18, 324) = 1.81, p < .05, ηp2 = .1] was 
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the only significant multivariate interaction. While the 
Violation Type x Partner [Pillai’s V = .3, F(6, 70) = 2.07, 
p = .07, ηp2 = .15] interaction was only marginally 
significant, and the interactions of Round x Partner 
[Pillai’s V = .04, F(9, 324) = .42, p = .92, ηp2 = .01] and 
the three-way interaction between Round x Violation 
Type x Partner [Pillai’s V = .13, F(18, 324) = .83, p = 
.67, ηp2 = .04] were not significant. Next, we explored 
the repeated measures analysis of variance (RM 
ANOVA) for each outcome. Table 1 illustrates the 
results of the RM ANOVAs. 
3.1.1. Ability Perceptions. The main effects of Round 
and Violation Type were statistically significant for 
ability perceptions. The main effect of Partner was not 
significant. The main effects were qualified by a Round 
x Violation Type interaction. All other interactions were 
not significant. Figure 1 (left) displays the estimated 
marginal means of ability perceptions over time by 
manipulation. As illustrated in Figure 1 (left), the 
Ability manipulation had the strongest effect on ability 
perceptions, whereas there was no difference between 
the Benevolence and Integrity manipulations.
 
Table 1. RM ANOVA Results for All Outcome Variables 
 
 Ability Benevolence Integrity Risk-Taking Behavior 
 df F η2p df F η2p df F η2p df F η2p 
R 1.77, 
63.69 
25.39* 0.41 2.16, 
77.68 
29.2** 0.45 2.31, 
83.18 
39.93** 0.53 2.02, 
72.77 
21.97** 0.38 
VT 2, 36 4.4** 0.20 2, 36 0.49 0.03 2, 36 0.56 0.03 2, 36 0.12 0.01 
P 1, 36 0.01 0.00 1, 36 0.12 0.00 1, 36 0.27 0.01 1, 36 1.93 0.05 
R*VT 3.54, 
63.69 
3.77* 0.17 4.32, 
77.68 
0.43 0.02 4.62, 
83.18 
0.5 0.03 4.04, 
72.77 
1.19 0.06 
R* P 1.77, 
63.69 
0.30 0.001 2.16, 
77.68 
0.39 0.01 2.31, 
83.18 
0.44 0.01 2.02, 
72.77 
4.7* 0.12 
VT*P 2, 36 1.05 0.06 2, 36 1.17 0.06 2, 36 3.14 0.15 2, 36 0.79 0.04 
R*VT*P 3.54, 
63.69 
0.1 0.01 4.31, 
77.68 
1.05 0.06 4.62, 
83.18 
1.16 0.06 4.04, 
72.77 
0.69 0.04 
Note. R = Round, VT= Violation Type, P = partner, df = degrees of freedom, η2p  = partial eta squared, * = p < 
.05, ** = p < .01. 
3.1.2. Benevolence. The main effect of Round was the 
only significant main effect on benevolence 
perceptions. No other main effects nor interactions 
were significant. Figure 1 (middle) illustrates the 
estimated marginal means of benevolence across time 
and manipulations.  These scores also declined 
significantly following Round 3 and continued to 
remain low following the successive violation in 
Round 4. The increase after Round 5 is also present for 
these graphs after the Trust Repair in the final round. 
Thus, when trust is violated, benevolence perceptions 
decline, and when it is repaired, it increases but not to 
a full recovery of pre-violation levels. 
 
Figure 1. Time by Manipulation for Each Trustworthiness Outcome 
 
Note. Ability, benevolence, and integrity outcomes for ability (long dash line), benevolence (short dash line), and 
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3.1.3. Integrity. The main effect of Round was the only 
significant main effect. The Violation x Partner 
interaction was marginally significant. No other main 
effects nor interactions were significant. Figure 1 (right) 
illustrates the Ability, Benevolence, and Integrity 
manipulations on perceived integrity over time. 
Integrity perceptions declined significantly following 
Round three and continued to remain low following the 
successive violation in Round 4. The increase in Round 
5, following the Trust Repair, is also present. Similar to 
the other conditions, trust did not recover to pre-
violation levels. Thus, perceptions of integrity 
decreased following a trust violation, regardless of 
whether the violation was an Ability-, Benevolence-, or 
Integrity-based violation. Although the Manipulation x 
Partner interaction was only marginally significant, we 
plotted the interaction in Figure 2. As illustrated in 
Figure 2, overall integrity perceptions were higher for 
the human in the condition when Ability was 
manipulated. In contrast, integrity perceptions for the 
human were lower than the robot when Integrity was 
manipulated. There were no differences in the 
Benevolence condition. 
Figure 2. Manipulation by Partner for Integrity 
Outcome 
 
Note. Integrity outcomes for A = ability, B = 
benevolence, and I = integrity manipulations by partner 
(human = grey, robot = white). 
3.2. Risk-taking Behaviors 
Lastly, we conducted a RM ANOVA on risk-taking 
behaviors. The main effect of Round was the only 
significant main effect, while the Round x Partner 
interaction was the only significant interaction. The RM 
ANOVA results are reported in Table 1. As shown in 
Figure 3, risk-taking behaviors (or amount of money 
loaned) declined after each successive round. The Trust 
Repair behavior occurred in the last Round, after the 
risk-taking behavior took place. Thus, there was no 
opportunity for this behavior to recover like the 
perceptions of the trustworthiness dimensions did. What 
is unique about these results is that there was a 
significant difference between the overall risk-taking 
behavior over time across Partner types. Participants 
were more likely to risk more money with a Robot than 
a Human partner, following the trust violation. 
 
Figure 3. Time by Partner for the Loan amount 
 
Note. Loan amounts for human (dash line) and robot 
(solid line) conditions. 
4. Discussion  
The purpose of the current study was to examine 
perceived trustworthiness and risk-taking behavior in 
the context of human-human and human-robot 
interactions, and how this relationship is affected by 
different kinds of trust violations. We manipulated the 
partner and violation type in a trust game to determine 
the effect on the perceived trustworthiness of the partner 
(human or robot) and risk-taking behavior. Results 
indicate that participant’s perceived trustworthiness of 
their partner decreased over time, as did their risk-taking 
behavior when trust was violated. In addition, 
participants’ perceptions were most sensitive to 
ability/performance-based violations, and ability 
perceptions decreased over time during these violations. 
However, no differences between violations were found 
for manipulation type on behavior. In addition, we 
found some partner effects. There was a marginal 
interaction of manipulation and partner on integrity 
perceptions such that if the violation performed was an 
ability violation, the robot partner incurred a stronger 
decrease in integrity perceptions. In contrast, if the 
violation was integrity-based, the human partner 
incurred a stronger decrease in integrity perceptions. 
Lastly, participants performed more trusting behaviors 
with a robot partner than a human over the entire 
experiment. 
Overall, these results support past meta-analytic 
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human trust [35] and empirical results from Alarcon et 
al [34] showing that violations of ability perceptions are 
most impactful on trust criterion compared to 
benevolence- or integrity-based violations. Moreover, 
we replicate and extend Alarcon et al. [18] showing that 
there were minimal differences in how humans perceive 
violations of trustworthiness (of any kind) from human 
or robot referents, supporting the CASA model [13]. 
4.1. Trust Biases and Human Machine 
Teaming 
We hypothesized that trust biases, such as 
automation bias [17], would influence perceptions and 
behaviors in the trust game. Specifically, these biases 
would lead to higher ratings on ability perceptions and 
lower perceptions of benevolence and integrity [H1, H5, 
H8] prior to trust violations. We hypothesized greater 
risk-taking behavior [H2,] for those paired with a robot 
partner than a human partner before a trust violation, 
due to the performance-based task and biases that robots 
should perform better than humans [17, 32]. Similarly, 
we expected that ability/performance- and 
integrity/consistency-based violations of trust would 
result in more detrimental effects in ability and integrity 
trustworthiness dimensions [H3, H9], and risk-taking 
behavior [H4, H10] for those paired with robot partners 
than human partners, but the opposite would be true for 
the effects of benevolence/intent-based trust violations 
[H6, H7]. Overall, we only found two interactions for 
partner effects which were supported statistically: the 
effect of partner on trust behaviors over time and the 
marginal interaction of manipulation type and partner on 
integrity perceptions. 
We found that ability-based violations had the 
strongest impact on ability perceptions, providing 
evidence that this manipulation was perhaps strongest 
and more clearly defined from the benevolence and 
integrity manipulations. Benevolence and integrity 
perceptions were not differentially influenced by the 
quality of the trust violation. As Alarcon et al. [18] 
noted, it is difficult to tease apart benevolence- and 
integrity-based trust violations. However, ability-based 
violations may be most relevant on perceptions of 
ability, particularly in a task where runner competence 
may be the most meaningful aspect of trustworthiness. 
In terms of partner effects, we found two interesting 
findings. First, participants were more likely to risk 
money with robot partners than human partners 
following the trust violation (regardless of the quality of 
that violation) over the entire experiment, complicating 
the interpretation that violations of ability (and integrity) 
should reduce trust more so when attributed to machines 
compared to humans [17, 32].  Our results demonstrated 
no partner differences prior to the trust violation. 
However, once trust was violated, participants 
performed less trust behaviors toward the human than 
the robot. This may be because we had three different 
conditions with different trust violations which either 
were biased towards the robot [H4, H10] or towards the 
human [H7]. Thus, we may not have had the statistical 
power to differentiate between the conditions.  Second, 
we found a marginal effect of manipulation and partner 
on integrity perceptions. Specifically, if the violation 
was ability-based, participants perceived higher 
integrity of the human than the robot. In contrast, if the 
violation was integrity-based, participants perceived the 
robot as having higher integrity. We can understand 
these findings in the context of the unique agent 
hypothesis. If a robot performs poorly (ability 
violation), participants may perceive the robot as having 
less integrity as it should perform without errors. In 
contrast, participants may have been more forgiving of 
a human running the task. When an integrity violation 
occurs, participants perceived higher integrity for the 
robot than the person. This may be due to the fact that 
robots lack true intentionality. In other words, the 
participants may not have perceived the robot as being 
able to betray, whereas a human has the intentionality to 
do so. Indeed, Alarcon et al. [18] noted that both 
benevolence and integrity violations may signal 
intentionality and may thus be more appropriate 
ascriptions of humans. However, this finding should be 
interpreted with caution as the marginal interaction is 
not statistically significant at the p < .05 cutoff. 
4.2. Implications 
Overall trust perceptions and behaviors decreased 
over time as expected. However, we found few effects 
of partner type. These findings are somewhat in line 
with mapping these trustworthiness dimensions on to 
the CASA [13], in that it appears that the participants 
attributed most of these trustworthiness dimensions to 
their robot partners, or at least in a similar fashion to 
how they were attributed to the human partners (see also 
[18]). However, we did find support for the unique agent 
hypothesis in the marginal interaction of the 
manipulation and partner on integrity and on the 
interaction of partner and time on behaviors. 
Additionally, the ability-based trust-violation 
condition did result in lower ability perception ratings 
overall, and overtime, this is likely due to the nature of 
the task itself, rather than partner type. In fact, it appears 
that participants’ trustworthiness perceptions, overall, 
did not vary across partner types over time. This implies 
that participants perceived the “humanlike” robot and 
the human partners to be, roughly, equally trustworthy 
and that the PAS bias did not differentiate the trust 
process in this task, with the marginal exception of 
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integrity. As similar findings were reported by Alarcon 
et al. [18], it may be that Checkmate relies heavily on 
performance perceptions to shape trust, regardless of 
whether the partner is a human or a robot. When the task 
is dependent on performance, it may be less relevant if 
the reason for the trust violation can be attributed to non-
performance aspects (benevolence and integrity). Yet 
again, we see how important contextual constraints are 
at shaping the trust process in human-human and 
human-robot interaction (see also Sanders et al., [19]). 
It was found that participants were more likely to 
risk more money with a robot partner than a human 
partner after a trust violation. This was unexpected in 
that the effect of trust violations were expected to be 
qualified by partner type, so that participants should 
have been more cautious with the robot partner (i.e., 
risked less money than the human partner) following 
ability and integrity (but not benevolence) trust 
violations. However, the results indicate participants 
trusted the robot partner’s potential to provide them with 
greater monetary returns than the human partner 
regardless of the quality of the violation. 
4.3. Limitations and Future Research 
Although these results may seem at odds with the 
models that were originally proposed, there are several 
possible interpretations that could help to explain these 
differences. First, many of these models were built using 
data that involved human-computer/human-machine 
interactions and not human-robot teaming. As the NAO 
robot partner had more human characteristics (i.e. arms, 
legs, head, face, human name, and voice) than a 
computer or a less anthropomorphic robot, this could 
explain the lack of differences between partner types 
(see also [18]). Secondly, the participant was only 
introduced to their human partner at the very beginning 
of the study, before being isolated to separate rooms. 
There were no natural interactions between the 
participant and the human partner (e.g., no way to chat, 
or see each other) throughout the experiment, and 
participants could only see the result of the choices their 
confederate, human partner was “selecting” within in 
the trust game. Therefore, the interaction with the 
human partner is somewhat unnatural and heavily 
computer mediated. This contrasts with the robot 
partner being in the same room as the participant, 
making movements and vocalizations throughout the 
experiment. The human partner in a separate room was 
done to ensure the participant thought they were playing 
with a human. If they were in the same room, the 
participant might be able to glance over at the human 
confederate’s screen and realize everything was pre-
recorded. It would be interesting to see if these results 
would still hold true with more natural human-human 
teaming and/or less anthropomorphic robots. Third, the 
robot keeping part of the profits was done to instantiate 
risk, however this may have been confusing for 
participants as robots do not have use for monetary 
rewards. Future research should explore ability, 
benevolence and integrity violations in more 
ecologically valid scenarios to ensure the validity of the 
current study. Finally, our sample is underpowered 
which lead us to interpret our results with caution. 
However, at present, we are collecting data to bolster the 
power of this study and aim to present these data in a 
peer-reviewed manuscript. 
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